Crime Punishment In Suburbia(2000)

Roseanne Skolnick (Monica Keena) is a popular cheerleader and girlfriend of the football player Jimmy (James DeBello), and she has a very dysfunctional family: her mother Maggie Skolnick (Ellen Barkin) is having an affair with a bartender and her stepfather Fred Skolnick (Michael Ironside) is a drunken and aggressive man. Vincent (Vincent Kartheiser) is a sweet and weird teenager, who studies in the same class and has a crush on Roseanne. He follows her everywhere with his camera, taking lots of pictures of her in the most different places or situations. When Roseanne is abused by her stepfather, she decides to kill him, with the support of Jimmy. However, her mother Maggie takes the blame and goes to the court for trial, being accused of murder. During the trial of her mother, Roseanne has to live with her guilt, being supported by Vincent. In the end, she has to decide: leave her mother be convicted and live with the feeling of guilt for the rest of her life, or assume the responsibility for the crime. "Crime and Punishment in Suburbia" is a surprisingly great teen free adaptation of Fyodor Dostoyevsky's "Crime and Punishment". The screenplay is very well developed and the young cast has excellent performance. Although having a great moral in the end, with the redemption of Roseanne, the direction is so good that is able to conclude the plot without being corny. I like good contemporaries free adaptations of famous romances, and this one has not disappointed me. My vote is eight.Title (Brazil): "Crime + Castigo" ("Crime + Punishment")

Crime Punishment in Suburbia(2000)

CJ 261 INTRODUCTION TO THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM. [CRIJ 1301] An introductory course designedto familiarize students with the facets of the criminal justice system, the sub-systems and how they interrelate, processingof offenders, punishment and its alternatives, and the future of the criminal justice system. Credit 3.

CJ 262 CRIMINOLOGY. [CRIJ 1307] Crime as a form of deviant behavior; nature and extent of crime; pastand present theories; evaluation of prevention, control, and treatment programs. Credit 3.

CJ 264 FUNDAMENTALS OF CRIMINAL LAW. [CRIJ 1310] A course in substantive criminal law whichincludes definition of law, definition of crime, general principles of criminal responsibility, elements of themajor crimes, punishments, conditions or circumstances which may excuse from criminal responsibility ormitigate punishment, the court system of Texas and the United States, basic concepts of criminal law withemphasis on the penal law of the State of Texas. Credit 3.

CJ 268 CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION. [CRIJ 2314] Survey of scientific crime detection methods;identification and preservation of evidence; instrumentation, and report writing. Prerequisite: CJ 267 orconsent of instructor. Credit 3.

CJ 362 WHITE COLLAR CRIME. The study of the ideas and perspectives that are dominant in the field ofwhite-collar crime. Topics such as organizational crime, occupational crime, legislation aimed at white collarcrime, law enforcement, causes of white collar crime, and possible forms of intervention will be discussed.Prerequisites: CJ 261 and CJ 262.

CJ 480 VICTIMOLOGY. Survey of the literature, research and current trends concerning the victim in thecriminal justice system; particular attention is given to the victim rights and compensation, fear of crimemeasuring victimization, and the impact of victimization on the individual. Credit 3.

When a defendant successfully appeals a criminal conviction, California's constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy precludes the imposition of more severe punishment on resentencing. (People v. Henderson (1963) 60 Cal. 2d 482, 495-497 [35 Cal. Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 677] (Henderson).) The question here is whether a statutorily mandated restitution fine comes within this rule. We conclude such fines constitute punishment and find no principled basis for excluding them from the rationale of Henderson. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeal, which upheld a $9,000 increase in defendant's restitution fine on resentencing.

A jury convicted defendant Melvin Eugene Hanson of first degree murder (Pen. Code, 187, subd. (a); all undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code), three counts of insurance fraud (former Ins. Code, 556, now Ins. Code, 1871.1), two counts of grand theft (Pen. Code, 487, former subd. 1), and conspiracy to commit these crimes (id., 182). It also found true a special circumstance allegation (id., 190.2, subd. (a)(1)) and two excessive taking allegations (id., 12022.6, subd. (b)). The trial court sentenced defendant to life in prison without the possibility of parole for the special circumstance murder conviction in addition to various terms of imprisonment on the other counts. The court also imposed a restitution fine of $1,000 pursuant to former Government Code section 13967, subdivision (a). (Stats. 1988, ch. 975, 1, pp. 3151-3152.)

The seminal decision of Henderson, supra, 60 Cal. 2d 482, and its progeny lie at the crux of the issue before us. In Henderson, the defendant secured reversal of his murder conviction for which he had been sentenced to life in prison. Following retrial, he was again convicted of murder but was sentenced to receive the death penalty. On appeal, he argued the increased punishment violated the state's prohibition against double jeopardy, and this court agreed. fn. 1

In reaching this conclusion, we analogized to the rule of both state and federal law that under the double jeopardy clause "a reversed conviction of a lesser degree of a crime precludes conviction of a higher degree on retrial ...." (Henderson, supra, "60 Cal.2d at p. 497; see Gomez v. Superior Court (1958) 50 Cal. 2d 640, 645-649 [328 P.2d 976]; Green v. United States (1957) 355 U.S. 184, 190 [78 S. Ct. 221, 225, 2 L. Ed. 2d 199].) "It is immaterial to [23 Cal. 4th 359] the basic purpose of the constitutional provision against double jeopardy whether the Legislature divides a crime into different degrees carrying different punishments or allows the court or jury to fix different punishments for the same crime." (Henderson, supra, "60 Cal.2d at p. 497.) In either instance, "a defendant is not required to elect between suffering an erroneous conviction to stand unchallenged and appealing therefrom at the cost of forfeiting a valid defense to the greater offense ...." (Id. at p. 496.) " ' "[A] defendant faced with such a 'choice' takes a 'desperate chance' in securing the reversal of the erroneous conviction. The law should not, and in our judgment does not, place the defendant in such an incredible dilemma." ' [Citation.]" (Ibid., quoting Gomez v. Superior Court, supra, "50 Cal.2d at pp. 651-652, quoting Green v. United States, supra, 355 U.S. at p. 193 [78 S.Ct. at p. 227].) In sum, "[a] defendant's right of appeal from an erroneous judgment is unreasonably impaired when he is required to risk his life to invoke that right. Since the state has no interest in preserving erroneous judgments, it has no interest in foreclosing appeals therefrom by imposing unreasonable conditions on the right to appeal." (Henderson, supra, "60 Cal.2d at p. 497; see also In re Cameron (1968) 68 Cal. 2d 487, 491-492 [67 Cal. Rptr. 529, 439 P.2d 633] [finding that habeas corpus petitioner who had received life imprisonment did not deliberately bypass orderly procedure of appeal under pre-Henderson rule due to fear of death penalty on resentencing].)

This reasoning has not remained confined to the capital sentencing context. (Cf. People v. Superior Court (Marks) (1991) 1 Cal. 4th 56, 77, fn. 19 [2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389, 820 P.2d 613].) In People v. Ali (1967) 66 Cal. 2d 277 [57 Cal. Rptr. 348, 424 P.2d 932], the defendant was originally sentenced concurrently on three counts of credit card fraud. On resentencing following appeal, he received consecutive terms. In light of Henderson, this court unanimously found error: "Where a defendant has been sentenced to concurrent terms and then upon a retrial is sentenced to consecutive terms for the same offenses, his punishment has been increased by indirect means. The reasoning which prevents an increase by direct means would seem to be applicable in such a situation, as a defendant should not be required to risk being given greater punishment on a retrial for the privilege of exercising his right to appeal." (People v. Ali, supra, "66 Cal.2d at p. 281.)

This court agreed and reversed the conviction with directions to dismiss the count in question. Given the circumstances, we did not foreclose reinstatement of any or all of the other 14 charges, but nevertheless circumscribed the permissible range of punishment. "[W]e must fashion a remedy that restores to the state the benefits for which it bargained without depriving defendant of the bargain to which he remains entitled. [] This may best be effected by permitting the state to revive one or more of the dismissed counts, but limiting defendant's potential sentence to not more than three years in state prison, the term of punishment set by the Community Release Board pursuant to the determinate sentencing act [citation]." (People v. Collins, supra, 21 Cal.3d at p. 216.) In support of this determination, the court cited to "a line of cases based on principles of double jeopardy" in which our concerns were "specifically to preclude vindictiveness and more generally to avoid penalizing a defendant for pursuing a successful appeal." (Ibid.) As in Henderson, we concluded the defendant "should not be penalized for properly invoking [precedent] to overturn his erroneous conviction and sentence by being rendered vulnerable to punishment more severe than under his plea bargain." fn. 2 (Collins, at p. 217; see also People v. Hood (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 444, 459 [82 Cal. Rptr. 618, 462 P.2d 370] [on retrial, court could impose sentence of not more than 14 years, the defendant's maximum term had he not appealed]; cf. In re Ferguson (1965) 233 Cal. App. 2d 79, 81-82 [43 Cal. Rptr. 325] [following Henderson, no increase in punishment on resentencing after successful new trial motion].) fn. 3 041b061a72